Main reasons of Georgia-Russia war in 2008 and its consequences on Regional Stability

By:  Dr. Nika Chitadze.  

Introduction

The Russian invasion in Georgia has not changed the balance of power in the South Caucasus and Black Sea Region. It simply announced that the balance of power had already shifted. It should be mentioned, that the war somehow changed the energy environment in the Black Sea and Caucasus Regions and attitude toward the several energy projects, which are already functioning or considered to be implemented in the future.

Main reasons of the Russian aggression in Georgia

For the better understanding of Russian policy in august 2008, it is important to analyze the global processes that were triggered by the collapse of the Soviet Union in the beginning of 90-th of the XX Century, and to clarify, how these processes were perceived by Russia itself.

   It is necessary to point out about four major factors, which shaped the post-Soviet international environment for Russia:

1.      the eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union after the ending of “Cold war”;

2.      alternative oil and gas transit routes

3.      the “colour revolutions” in Georgia and Ukraine

4.      Recognition of the independence of Kosovo by western states

The eastward enlargement of NATO and the European Union. After the collapse of USSR, former socialist countries from the Central and East Europe joined western alliances, notably NATO and the EU. Russia considered this process as a threat to its foreign policy and national security priorities. At the same time, the increasing cooperation of former Soviet Republics with North-Atlantic Alliance and EU via NATO program partnership for peace and European Neighborhood policy, or their admission to these organizations, was especially worrying for Political elite of Russia. Three Central European countries became NATO members in 1999. Later, in 2004, Seven-Baltic and Eastern European states joined NATO and EU. In 2007, plenipotentiary members of EU  became Romania and Bulgaria. So, EU enlargement went hand in hand with NATO expansion.

Alternative oil and gas transit routes. In 1994, leading international oil companies and  Azerbaijan signed a “century contract” to operate the country’s offshore oil fields. Later, governments of western countries and companies also agreed to construct Baku-Supsa (in 1996-1997) and the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (in 1999) oil pipelines and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (1999) gas pipeline to deliver Azerbaijani oil and gas to European markets, bypassing Russian territory. On June 27, 2006, the European Commission, three countries from Black Sea Region - Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania, together with Hungary and Austria signed an agreement to build Nabucco, a natural gas pipeline that will transport about 20-26 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan to Austria via Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary. (The Nabucco project has not started yet.) Russia, which as it is known is a major supplier of oil and natural gas to world markets, especially to Europe, was very irritated about alternative energy transit projects. Russian authorities are  afraid that Moscow will lose its leverage to influence politically and economically on post-Soviet countries and European Union, and lose additional income from transit fees, in case if alternative energy projects are implemented.

The “color revolutions” in three former Soviet Republics. Massive electoral falsification in the November 2003 parliamentary polls, sparked civil unrest in Georgia and led to the fall of Eduard Shevardnadze’s government in November 23, 2003. One of the main leader of the so-called Rose revolution was US-educated Michael Saakashvili, who had the support of a majority of population of Georgia. The success of the Georgian revolution inspired similar events in Ukraine one year later. The so-called Orange revolution in December 2004, which as in Georgia was triggered by presidential election rigging, swept Viktor Yushchenko and his pro-western “orange coalition” to power. One year later, rigged elections in Kyrgyzstan caused the so-called Tulip Revolution.

Recognition of the independence of Kosovo by western states. When NATO declared about its bombing campaign against Serbia in March 1999, main purpose of which was  protection of the ethnic Albanian minority of Kosovo from Serbian Armed forces, Russia felt that its international prestige and credibility were dealt a severe below. Since 19-th Century, Serbia had very important place in Russia’s foreign policy. Russian emperors always tried to be involved in the Balkans political affairs under the pretext of supporting their fellow Slavic and Orthodox nation.

After the ending of the military operation of NATO in Serbia, opposition to Kosovo’s independence became one of the main elements of Russian foreign policy. Prestige apart, Russia’s objections were caused by the fear that possible recognition of the independence of Kosovo could cause separatist tendencies in its ethnic enclaves (mainly in the North Caucasus and Volga region). Kosovo formally declared independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008. Almost immediately, a majority of NATO and EU member states responded by acknowledgement the former Serbian province as an independent country. Vladimer Putin, the Russian President  during this period, condemned the recognition of Kosovo’s independence as “immoral and illegal” and threatened global upheavals. The Kremlin warned that the Kosovo case would inevitably set a precedent for other “frozen conflicts” on the post-Soviet space, especially in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Moscow felt that it was necessary to respond to these events firmly in order to reassert its credibility and prestige as a major world power. After Kosovo’s independence, Russia issued strongly worded political statements but took few practical steps. This led many, separatist authorities among them, to question Russia’s real capabilities.

Apart from the having necessity to protect and/or restore its international prestige, Russia’s motivation for implementation aggressive actions against Georgia can be explained by several other factors: 1) Rapid increasing of oil and gas prices over the past five years boosted Russia’s revenues and pumped billions of petrodollars into its coffers. Due to it, GDP of Russia was increased from 200 billion US dollars in 2000, till 1,1 trillion US dollars in 2007; 2) the European Union has become increasingly dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies; 3) USA and NATO were involved in the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq; 4) the presidential campaign is full gear in the USA.

After the collapse of USSR, since 1992 till 2008, Russia encouraged the separatist movements in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, supplying separating regimes by military equipment and support them financially and by this way implemented “indirect aggression” against Georgia, but on April 16, 2008, Moscow undertook the first more radical and open measures to protect its prestige and its “privileged interests” on the post-Soviet territories. After NATO Summit in Bucharest, the Russian president decreed the establishment of direct and stronger formal ties with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Earlier, the Kremlin had withdrawn from a CIS resolution (adopted in 1996) on economic sanctions against Abkhazia and restrictions on the deployment of armaments on Abkhazian territory.

After these “legislative” initiatives, Russia began large-scale military exercises on the Russian-Georgian border, including naval exercises in the Black Sea, which continued almost incessantly from May 2008. The largest of them, codenamed “Caucasus 2008”, involved some 8000 military personnel and lasted until August 3. Russia’s military aggression against Georgia began one week earlier of August 8 - when main forces of Russian troops invaded in Georgian territory-particularly in South Ossetia. During this period, Russians and Ossetian separatists opened fire and during one week bombed Georgian villages in South Ossetia and killed Georgian peacekeepers and civil population and forced Georgian Armed forces to be involved in military operations in August 7. The final consequence of the Russia-Georgia war was recognition of South Ossetia ‘s and Abkhazia’s independence in August 25, which was in fact Moscow’s final response to the “western offensive”.

Among of those above-mentioned factors, it is important to pay special attention on the alternative oil and gas transit routes, which bypass the territory of Russia. As it is known, Moscow considers the implementation of the energy projects as one of the main threat for the national security of Russia. Political circles in Russia clearly understand, that because of significant amount of oil and natural gas in Caspian Region – 200 Billion Barrels of oil (32 Billion Tones) – Caspian Sea region has become the area of strategic interests of many leading Countries of the world. America and other democratic and economically developed states during the last several years are seriously considering extraction and exploration of Caspian Oil and Natural gas, which is a very important political and economic factor. One of the priorities for western states is to avoid the dependence on politically unstable Middle East and Russia (especially after military aggression of Russia against Georgia in August 2008 and “gas crisis” between Russia and Ukraine in January 2009), to find the alternatives sources in the oil-rich regions and to allow their oil companies to explore oil fields there.

About the author:

Dr. Nika Chitadze is a specialist in Caucasus geopolitics, World Politics and strategic affairs. He is currently the Director of the Center for International Studies and Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences at the International Black Sea University in Tbilisi, Georgia. He is also President of the George C. Marshall Alumni Union, Georgia – International and Security Research Center. 

Dr. Chitadze previously served as senior advisor on the National Security Council of Georgia and was Head of the Public Relations Division of the State Agency for Regulation of Oil and Gas Resources of Georgia. He has also held senior positions in the Department of Strategic and Military Policy at the Georgian Ministry of Defense and foreign policy research and analysis center of the Ministry of Foreign affairs. Dr. Chitadze has received his educational credentials in Georgia (Tbilisi State University and Diplomatic Academy of Georgia) as well as several international higher educational institutions, including Oxford University in the UK, George C. Marshall European College for Security Studies (Germany) and several other well known European educational institutions. He is author of the about 170 researches and articles and six books on Geopolitics, political geography and International Relations.